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Abstract— Watermarking can detect sensor attacks in control
systems by injecting a private signal into the control, whereby
attacks are identified by checking the statistics of the sensor
measurements and private signal. However, past approaches as-
sume full state measurements or a centralized controller, which
is not found in networked LTI systems with subcontrollers.
Since generally the entire system is neither controllable nor
observable by a single subcontroller, communication of sensor
measurements is required to ensure closed-loop stability. The
possibility of attacking the communication channel has not been
explicitly considered by previous watermarking schemes, and
requires a new design. In this paper, we derive a statistical wa-
termarking test that can detect both sensor and communication
attacks. A unique (compared to the non-networked case) aspect
of the implementing this test is the state-feedback controller
must be designed so that the closed-loop system is controllable
by each sub-controller, and we provide two approaches to design
such a controller using Heymann’s lemma and a multi-input
generalization of Heymann’s lemma. The usefulness of our
approach is demonstrated with a simulation of detecting attacks
in a platoon of autonomous vehicles. Our test allows each vehicle
to independently detect attacks on both the communication
channel between vehicles and on the sensor measurements.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major challenge in designing networked control systems
is ensuring resilience of subcontrollers to malicious attacks
[1], [1]–[3]. Unlike systems with a centralized controller
where sensor attacks occur only on the output measurements,
networked control systems are also susceptible to attacks on
the communication channel used to transfer measurements
between subcontrollers. Though cryptography and cyberse-
curity [4]–[7] can secure communication channels, many
networked control system applications feature rapid reconfig-
uration of the network and cannot operate in real-time with
the overhead required to establish secure communication
channels. For instance, consider a platoon of autonomous
vehicles where vehicles rapidly enter or exit the platoon.
This paper develops a statistical watermarking approach
for detecting malicious sensor and communication attacks
on networked LTI systems. Our first contribution is to design
a watermarking test using null hypothesis testing [8]–[12],
and this requires characterizing the statistics of states and
private watermarking signals under the dynamics of multi-
ple subcontrollers within the networked system. A unique
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feature (as compared to the non-networked setting) of the
watermarking scheme is it requires the state-feedback control
to be such that the closed-loop system is controllable by each
subcontroller, because otherwise a subcontroller could not
independently verify the lack of an attack. Our second con-
tribution is to provide two approaches to constructing such
a state-feedback control, and this partly involves deriving a
multi-input generalization of Heymann’s lemma [13], [14].
A. Watermarking for LTI Systems
Watermarking been proposed for detecting sensor attacks
in LTI systems [8]–[12], [15]–[17]. The idea is that a random
signal is added to the control, and the statistics of the sensor
measurements and random signal are compared to check for
sensor attacks. Some schemes use null hypothesis testing
[8]–[12], while dynamic watermarking [15]–[17] ensures
only attacks adding a zero-average-power signal to the sensor
measurements can remain undetected. Most watermarking
[8]–[12], [17] is for LTI systems with a centralized controller,
and only the approaches of [15], [16] can be used with
networked LTI systems; however, the approaches [15], [16]
require full state observation, which is not the case for many
systems. Our first contribution is to develop watermarking
for networked LTI systems with partial state observation.
B. Security for Intelligent Transportation Systems
Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) [16], [18]–[23]
may benefit from watermarking. For instance, [16] con-
sidered the use of dynamic watermarking to detect sensor
attacks in a network of autonomous vehicles coordinated
by a supervisory controller; the watermarking approach was
successfully able to detect attacks. However, large-scale
deployments of ITS must be resilient in the face of partial
state observations and partially distributed control structures.
For example, vehicle platoons are susceptible to malicious
interference of GPS and the communication channel between
vehicles [24]–[26]. Our third contribution is to conduct
a simulation that shows the efficacy of our watermarking
scheme in detecting attacks on a vehicle platoon.
C. Outline
Sect. II provides a model of the networked LTI system
we consider, and specifies a model for communication and
sensor attacks. Next, Sect. III presents an example to give
intuition about the new challenges with designing watermark-
ing for networked systems. We construct a statistical water-
marking test in Sect. IV, which allows each subcontroller to
independently check for the presence of communication or
sensor attacks. Our tests require a state-feedback controller
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such that the closed-loop system is controllable by each sub-
controller, and Sect. V provides two methods for constructing
such a controller. Last, Sect. VI conducts simulations of an
autonomous vehicle platoon. We show that our approach is
able to detect the presence or absence of sensor attacks and
attacks on the communication channel between vehicles.
II. NETWORKED LTI SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODALITIES
A. Dynamics and Measurement Model
We study a setting with κ subcontrollers. The subscripts
i or j denote the i-th or j-th subcontroller, and the subscript
n indicates time. Consider the LTI system with dynamics
xn+1 = Axn +
∑κ
i=1Biui,n + wn, (1)
where x ∈ Rp is the state, ui ∈ Rqi is the input of the i-
th subcontroller, and w ∈ Rp is a zero mean i.i.d. process
noise with a jointly Gaussian distribution and covariance
ΣW . Each subcontroller steers a subset of the actuators, and
each subcontroller makes the partial state observations
yi,n = Cixn + zi,n + vi,n, (2)
where yi ∈ Rmi is the observation of the i-th subcontroller,
zi ∈ Rmi is zero mean i.i.d. measurement noise with a jointly
Gaussian distribution and covariance ΣZ,I , and vi ∈ Rmi
should be interpreted as an additive measurement disturbance
that is added by an attacker.
B. Network Communication Model
The LTI system here is networked in the following sense:
The dynamics and partial observations are such that for
B =
[
B1 · · · Bκ
]
(3)
CT =
[
CT1 · · · CTκ
]
(4)
we have that (A,B) is stabilizable and (A,C) is detectable.
In general, (A,Bi) is not stabilizable for some (or all) i,
and similarly (A,Ci) is not detectable for some (or all)
i. Thus coordination is required between subcontrollers to
ensure closed-loop stability, and networking arises because
we assume each subcontroller communicates its own partial
state observations to all other subcontrollers. (Our setting
assumes communication has zero cost.) Consider the values
si,j,n = yj,n + νi,j,n, (5)
where si,j ∈ Rmj is the value communicated to subcontroller
i of the measurement made by subcontroller j, and νi,j,n ∈
Rmj should be interpreted as an additive communication
disturbance added by an attacker. Clearly νi,i,n ≡ 0 for all i,
since the i-th subcontroller already has its own measurement.
C. Controller and Observer Structure
The idea of statistical watermarking in this context will be
to superimpose a private (and random) excitation signal ei,n
known in value to only the i-th subcontroller but unknown in
value to the attacker or to the other subcontrollers. We will
apply the control input ui,n = Kixˆi,n+ei,n, where xˆi,n is the
observer-estimated state (the subscript i here indicates that
each subcontroller operates its own observer, and that xˆi,n is
the state estimated by the observer of the i-th subcontroller)
and ei,n are i.i.d. Gaussian with zero mean and constant
variance ΣE,I fixed by the subcontrollers.
Now let Ki be constant state-feedback gain matrices such
that A+
∑κ
i=1BiKi is Schur stable, and let Li be constant
observer gain matrices. It will be useful to define
KT =
[
KT1 · · · KTκ
]
(6)
L =
[
L1 · · · Lκ
]
(7)
Then the closed-loop system with private excitation is
xn+1 = Axn +
∑κ
j=1Bj(Kj xˆj,n + ej,n) + wn
xˆi,n+1 = (A+
∑κ
j=1BjKj +
∑κ
j=1 LjCj)xˆi,n+
−∑κj=1 LjCjxn +Biei,n+
−∑κj=1 Lj(zj,n + vj,n + νi,j,n)
(8)
These equations represent the fact that each subcontroller has
its own observer using the measurements that it has received.
It is not clear a priori that this closed-loop system is stable
since each observer may start at a different initial condition.
This concern is resolved by the following result:
Proposition 1: Let Ki and Li be constant state-feedback
and observer gains such that A + BK, A + LC, and A +
BK + LC are Schur stable. The closed-loop system (8) is
Schur stable with no private excitation ej,n ≡ 0, process
noise wn ≡ 0, measurement noise zj,n ≡ 0, measurement
attack vj,n ≡ 0, and communication attack νi,j,n ≡ 0.
Proof: Consider the change of variables from the states
x, xˆi to the states x, δ1, di where δ1 = xˆ1−x and di = xˆi−xˆ1
for i = 2, . . . , κ. Then inserting this change of variables into
(8) gives
xn+1 = (A+
∑κ
j=1BjKj)xn + (
∑κ
j=1BjKj)δ1,n+∑κ
j=2BjKjdj,n
δ1,n+1 = (A+
∑κ
j=1 LjCj)δ1,n −
∑κ
j=2BjKjdj,n
di,n+1 = (A+
∑κ
j=1BjKj +
∑κ
j=1 LjCj)di,n,
for i = 2, . . . , κ
(9)
If we put x, δi into a single vector xˇ, then the dynamics
xˇn+1 = Aˇxˇn are such that Aˇ is a block upper-triangular
matrix with A+BK, A+ LC, and A+BK + LC on the
diagonal. This means Aˇ is Schur stable since we assumed
A+BK, A+LC, and A+BK +LC are Schur stable.
Remark 1: This result implies that the separation principle
does not hold. Fortunately, this is not a substantial imped-
iment from the standpoint of design. Given a K such that
A + BK is stable, we can solve an LMI formulation [27],
[28] to choose (when feasible) a C such that both A+ LC
and A+BK + LC are Schur stable. In particular, suppose
there exists a positive definite matrix Q  0 and general
matrix R such that the following two LMI’s[
Q ATQ+ CTR
QTA+RTC Q
]
 0[
Q (A+BK)TQ+ CTR
QT(A+BK) +RTC Q
]
 0
(10)
are satisfied. Then choosing L = Q−1RT ensures that A +
LC and A+BK+LC are Schur stable. Convex optimization
can be used to determine if these LMI’s have a solution, and
compute a solution if possible.
For the purpose of designing our test, it will be useful to
define another change of variables on the states. Consider
the change of variables from the states x, xˆi to the states
x, δi where δi = xˆi − x for i = 2, . . . , κ. If there is no
measurement attack vj,n ≡ 0 and no communication attack
νi,j,n ≡ 0, then a straightforward calculation gives
xn+1 = (A+BK)xn +
∑κ
j=1Bj(Kjδj,n + ej,n) + wn
δi,n+1 = (A+BK + LC)δi,n +Biei,n −
∑κ
j=1 Ljzj,n+
−∑κj=1Bj(Kjδj,n + ej,n)− wn
(11)
If we define ∆T =
[
δT1 · · · δTκ
]
and ET =
[
eT1 · · · eTκ
]
,
then the above dynamics for the δi can be written as
∆n+1 = A∆n + blkdiag(B1, . . . , Bκ)En+
− [1 · · · 1]T ⊗ (−wn +∑κj=1 Ljzj,n +Bjej,n) ,
(12)
where ⊗ is the Kronecker product, blkdiag(B1, . . . , Bκ) is
the block diagonal matrix with B1, . . . , Bκ on the diagonals,
and A is the corresponding matrix defined to make the above
equivalent to (11). This will be used to define our test.
III. INTUITION FOR WATERMARKING DESIGN
Watermarking for networked systems faces new challenges
not encountered in the non-networked setting. To illustrate
the new difficulty, consider the networked LTI system with
A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
B1 =
[
1
0
]
B2 =
[
0
1
]
C1 =
[
1 0
]
C2 =
[
0 1
] (13)
In this example, (A,B1) is not stabilizable and (A,C2) is
not detectable. And so coordination is required between the
subcontrollers to stabilize the system.
For instance, the choice K = − 12 I makes A+BK Schur
stable, and implementing the corresponding output-feedback
controller requires communication of partial observations be-
tween the two subcontrollers. In this case, the design is such
that the first subcontroller cannot inject any watermarking
signal into the second state, while the second subcontroller
cannot inject any watermarking signal into the first state. This
is problematic because this means each subcontroller cannot
verify the accuracy of the communicated state information.
However, suppose we instead choose
K = −1
2
[
1 1
1 1
]
(14)
Then A + BK is Schur stable. More importantly, (A +
BK,B1) and (A + BK,B2) are controllable with this K.
Thus each subcontroller can inject a private watermarking
signal known only to the subcontroller, and such that this
signal can be used to verify the accuracy of the communi-
cated state information and of the partial observations.
This example shows that designing watermarking differs in
the networked and non-networked cases. The networked case
requires designing both the state-feedback controller and the
corresponding tests to detect attacks; whereas watermarking
in the non-networked case only requires designing the the
corresponding tests to detect attacks [8]–[12], [17].
IV. SPECIFICATION OF STATISTICAL TEST
Though watermarking for networked systems requires de-
signing both the state-feedback controller and watermarking
tests, we first focus on the latter. We construct a statistical test
using the framework of null hypothesis testing, after assum-
ing the existence of a state-feedback controller satisfying:
Condition 1: Let k′i,j = min{k ≥ 0 | Cj(A+BK)kBi 6=
0}. For each i and j, there exists a k′i,j ≤ p− 1.
This condition is itself nontrivial because it may be that
Cj(A+BK)
kBi ≡ 0 for all k ≥ 0. Approaches to synthesize
a state-feedback controller K to ensure the above condition
holds will be shown in the next section. This property is
important because it means the watermarking signal of the
i-th subcontroller is seen in the j-th output when the system
is controlled by perfect-information state-feedback.
A. Variable Definitions
Now before specifying the test, it is useful to define some
variables. Suppose we have K, L such that A+BK, A+LC,
and A+BK+LC are Schur stable. Let Σ∆ be the positive
semidefinite matrix that solves the Lyapunov equation
Σ∆ = AΣ∆A
T+
blkdiag(B1, . . . , Bκ)ΣEblkdiag(B1, . . . , Bκ)
T+
−
1 · · · 1... ... ...
1 · · · 1

T
⊗
(
ΣW +
∑κ
j=1 LjΣZ,J(Lj)
T+
BjΣE,J(Bj)
T
)
, (15)
where ΣE = blkdiag(ΣE,1, . . . ,ΣE,κ). A solution ex-
ists because the above is a Lyapunov equation and since
Proposition 1 ensured stability. Note by construction Σ∆ =
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 ∆n∆
T
n when there is no attack (i.e.,
vi,n ≡ 0 and νi,j,n ≡ 0 for all i, j, n). If we divide
Σ∆ ∈ Rκp×κp into sub-matrices with dimension p× p, then
define DI ∈ Rp×p to be the i× i-th sub-matrix of Σ∆.
Lastly, we consider the matrix dynamics
E(∆n+1eTi,t) = AE(∆neTi,t))+
fi ⊗BiΣE,I · 1(t = n)+
− [1 · · · 1]T ⊗ (BiΣE,I) · 1(t = n), (16)
where 1(·) is an indictor function, and the vector fi has a
one in the i-th position and is zero otherwise. This means
Σ∆,I,k := E(∆neTi,n−k−1) = A
kfi ⊗BiΣE,I+
−Ak [1 · · · 1]T ⊗ (BiΣE,I) . (17)
If we divide Σ∆,I,k ∈ Rκp×qi in sub-matrices of size p× qi,
then let QI,J,k ∈ Rp×qi be the j-th sub-matrix of Σ∆,I,k.
Algorithm 1 Compute State-Feedback K for Proposition 2
x1 :=
b1
‖b1‖
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p− 1} do
xk+1 := λ
k bk+1
‖bk+1‖
uk := B
−1(xk+1 −Axk)
end for
xp+1 := λ
p b1
‖b1‖
up := B
−1(xp+1 −Axp)
X :=
[
x1 · · · xp
]
U :=
[
u1 . . . up
]
K := UX−1
B. Definition of Test
Our statistical watermarking test will involve the (second-
order) statistical characterization of the vectors defined as
ψn,i,j =
[
ei,n−k′i,j−1
Cj xˆi,n − si,j,n
]
, (18)
and this characterization will be used to specify the distri-
bution corresponding to the null hypothesis of no attack.
Theorem 1: If we have that vi,n ≡ 0 and νi,j,n ≡ 0, then
as-limN
1
N
∑N−1
n=0 ψnψ
T
n = RI,J , where
RI,J =
[
ΣE,I Q
T
I,J,k′i,j
CTj
CjQI,J,k′i,j CjDiC
T
j + ΣZ,J
]
. (19)
Moreover, we have that as-limn E(ψn) = 0.
Proof: First note that we have as-limn E(δi,n) = 0
by the stability from Proposition 1. But Cj xˆi,n − si,j,n =
Cjδi,n − zj,n, and so E(Cj xˆi,n − si,j,n) = CjE(δi,n).
This implies as-limn E(Cj xˆi,n − si,j,n) = 0, which proves
as-limn E(ψn) = 0 since the ei have zero mean.
Next observe the upper block triangle of (19) is correct by
construction of QI,J,k′i,j and by definition of the ei, and so
we only have to prove that the lower-right block is correct.
In particular, note that E((Cjδi,n − zn)(Cjδi,n − zn)T) =
E((Cjδi,n)(Cjδi,n)T)+ΣZ,I since zi,n is independent of δi,n
by (11). This implies that we have that as-limn E((Cjδi,n−
zn)(Cjδi,n − zn)T) = CjDiCTj + ΣZ,I .
This result means that asymptotically the summation
Si,j =
1
`
∑n+`
n+1 ψn,i,jψ
T
n,i,j with ` ≥ (mi+qi) has a Wishart
distribution with ` degrees of freedom and a scale matrix that
matches (19), and we use this to define a statistical test. In
particular, we check if the negative log-likelihood
L = ∑κj=1(1− `+mi + qi) · log detSn,i,j+∑κ
j=1 trace
(
R−1I,J · Sn,i,j
)
(20)
corresponding to this Wishart distribution and the summa-
tions of Sn,i,j is large by conducting the hypothesis test{
reject, if L(Sn) > τ(α)
accept, if L(Sn) ≤ τ(α)
(21)
where τ(α) is a threshold that controls the false error rate
α. A rejection corresponds to the detection of an attack,
Algorithm 2 Compute State-Feedback K for Proposition 3
choose any v such that Bv ∈ ∩κi=1 range(Bi)
compute K ′ satisfying Heymann’s lemma for Bv
compute G such that A+BK ′ +BvG is Schur stable
K := K ′ + vG
while an acceptance corresponds to the lack of detection of
an attack. This notation emphasizes the fact that achieving
a specified false error rate α (a false error in our context
corresponds to detecting an attack when there is no attack
occurring) requires changing the threshold τ(α).
V. DESIGNING THE STATE-FEEDBACK
We provide two approaches for designing a state-feedback
controller that satisfies Condition 1. The first applies when B
is square (i.e.,
∑k
i=1 qi = p); though it generalizes to skinny
B (i.e.,
∑k
i=1 qi < p) in some cases, we do not prove this.
The first approach relies upon a multi-input generalization
(which we construct and prove) of Heymann’s lemma [13],
[14]. The second approach applies to B of arbitrary size
where the range spaces of Bi have a nonempty intersection.
A. Multiple Input Heymann’s Lemma
Heymann’s lemma [13], [14] is used to prove arbitrary
pole placement of controllable, multiple input LTI systems by
allowing a reduction to the case of arbitrary pole placement
of a controllable, single input LTI system. Formally, it says
Lemma 1 (Heymann’s Lemma): If (A,B) is controllable,
then for any b = Bv 6= 0 there exists K (that depends on b)
such that (A+BK, b) is controllable.
We need a multiple input generalization of Heymann’s
Lemma. Let bi denote the i-th column of the matrix B. Then
Proposition 2: If B is full rank and square-shaped (i.e.,
B ∈ Rp×p); then there exists a single K such that A+BK
is Schur stable and (A+BK, bi) is controllable for all i.
Proof: We prove this result stepwise. Since B is full
rank and square-shaped, its columns are linearly independent.
Consider any λ with 0 < |λ| < 1, and define x1 = b1‖b1‖ and
xn+1 = Axn+Bun. Now suppose there exists u1, . . . , uk−1
such that xi = λi−1 bi‖bi‖ for i = 1, . . . , k. If k < p, then there
exists a uk satisfying λk
bk+1
‖bk+1‖ − λk−1A bk‖bk‖ = Buk since
B is full rank. Hence by definition of the dynamics on x
there exists uk such that xk+1 = λk
bk+1
‖bk+1‖ . If k = p, then
there exists a up satisfying λp b1‖b1‖ − λp−1A
bp
‖bp‖ = Bup
since B is full rank. So by definition of the dynamics on x
there exists up such that xp+1 = λp b1‖b1‖ .
Next define the matrices
U =
[
u1 · · · up
]
(22)
R =
[
b1
‖b1‖ · · ·
bp
‖bp‖
]
(23)
Λ = diag
(
1, λ, . . . , λp−1
)
(24)
and K = UR−1Λ−1. The matrices Λ and R are invertible
by construction since 0 < |λ| < 1 and B is invertible. Note
that by definition U = KΛB. Finally, note for any i we have
‖bi‖ ·
[
bi
‖bi‖ · · ·
bp
‖bp‖
b1
‖b1‖ · · ·
bi−1
‖bi−1‖
]
· Λ =[
bi (A+BK)bi · · · (A+BK)p−1bi
]
. (25)
The left side has full rank by the assumptions on B, and the
right side is the observability matrix for the (A + BK, bi).
This proves (A + BK, bi) is observable for all i since we
have shown that the observability matrix has full rank.
We conclude by proving that the above designed K makes
A + BK Schur stable. Consider any x ∈ Rp, and observe
that by the assumptions on B there exists z ∈ Rp such that
x = Rz. But, as in (25), by construction (A+BK)p bi‖bi‖ =
λp bi‖bi‖ for all i. Hence (A + BK)
px = (A + BK)pRz =
λpRz = λpx for all x. This means all the eigenvalues of
(A+BK)p are λp, and using the spectral mapping theorem
implies the eigenvalues of A + BK are roots of λp. Thus
the magnitude of the eigenvalues of A+BK are |λ|, which
means that A+BK is Schur stable since 0 < |λ| < 1.
Though the above is an existence result, a state-feedback
matrix K satisfying Proposition 2 can be computed using
Algorithm 1. The correctness of this algorithm follows from
the construction used in the proof of Proposition 2. Also, the
next result proves that this K satisfies Condition 1.
Corollary 1: Suppose Cj 6= 0 for all j. If B is full rank
and square-shaped (i.e., B ∈ Rp×p); then there exists a K
such that A+BK is Schur stable and that Condition 1 holds.
Proof: Consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, and choose s to
be any index such that the s-th column in B belongs to Bi.
Proposition 2 says (A+BK, bs) is controllable. This means
the controllability matrix
C′ =
[
bs (A+BK)bs . . . (A+BK)
p−1bs
]
(26)
has rank(C′) = p, and so the controllability matrix
C =
[
Bi (A+BK)Bi . . . (A+BK)
p−1Bi
]
(27)
also has rank(C) = p since the columns of C are a superset
of the columns of C′. Thus by Sylvester’s rank inequality,
we have rank(CjC) ≥ rank(Cj) + rank(C)− p = rank(C).
But rank(Cj) ≥ 1 since Cj 6= 0. Combining this with the
earlier inequality gives rank(CjC) ≥ 1, and so CjC 6= 0.
This means k′i,j ≤ p− 1 exists since CjC is a block matrix
consisting of the blocks Cj(A+BK)kBi.
B. Nonempty Intersection of Inputs
We next consider B with arbitrary shape, such that the
range spaces of Bi have a nonempty intersection. Our
Algorithm 2 designs a K for this case, and it uses Heymann’s
lemma [13], [14]. The next result proves its correctness.
Proposition 3: Suppose Cj 6= 0 for all j and that we
have ∩κi=1 range(Bi) 6= ∅. If (A,B) is controllable, then
Algorithm 2 computes a K such that A + BK is Schur
stable and that Condition 1 is satisfied.
Proof: First note that v exists by assumption, and
so we can compute K ′ by Heymann’s lemma. This means
(A + BK ′, Bv) is controllable, which implies that we can
compute G such that A+BK ′+BvG is Schur stable. This
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Fig. 1. Value of (20) for Simulation of Vehicle Platoon, with a Negative
Log-Likelihood Threshold for α = 0.05 False Detection Error Rate
proves that A + BK is Schur stable since K = K ′ + vG.
Next consider any i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}. Since (A + BK ′, Bv)
is controllable, this means that (A + BK ′ + BvG,Bv)
is controllable. (This uses the well known fact that state-
feedback does not affect controllability.) As a result, we have
C′ =
[
Bv (A+BK)Bv . . . (A+BK)p−1Bv
]
(28)
has rank(C′) = p. But by assumption, there exists vi such
that Bivi = Bv. So if we define
C =
[
Bi (A+BK)Bi . . . (A+BK)
p−1Bi
]
, (29)
then we have that C′ = C blkdiag(vi, . . . , vi). Thus p ≥
rank(C) ≥ rank(C′) = p. Thus by Sylvester’s rank in-
equality, we have rank(CjC) ≥ rank(Cj) + rank(C)− p =
rank(C). But rank(Cj) ≥ 1 since Cj 6= 0. Combining this
with the earlier inequality gives rank(CjC) ≥ 1, and so
CjC 6= 0. This means k′i,j ≤ p − 1 exists since CjC is a
block matrix consisting of the blocks Cj(A+BK)kBi.
VI. SIMULATION: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE PLATOONING
We apply a standard model [29] for error kinematics of
speed control of vehicles to generate a model for a three
car platoon. The state vector for the three car platoon is
xT =
[
e1 d1 e2 d2 e3 d3
]
, where ei is deviation from the
desired velocity for car i, and di is deviation from the desired
following distance between car i and car i+1. The discretized
dynamics for a timestep of 0.05 seconds are then:
A =

1 0 0 0 0
− 120 1 120 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 − 120 1 120
0 0 0 0 1
 (30)
and
B1 =

1
20− 1800
0
0
0
 B2 =

0
1
800
1
20− 1800
0
 B3 =

0
0
0
1
800
1
20
 . (31)
Assuming each car measures its own velocity and the dis-
tance to the car in front of it, we have
C1 =
[
1 0 0 0 0
]
C2 =
[
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
]
C2 =
[
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
] (32)
We assume that the process and measurement noise had
variance ΣW = 5×10−5 ·I and ΣZ,I = 10−3 ·I, respectively.
We applied our statistical test (20) with each car using a
watermarking signal with variance ΣE,I = 0.2, where
K1 =
[−1 0.1 0 0 0]
K2 =
[
1 −1 −2 0.1 0]
K3 =
[
0.5 −0.5 0.5 −1 −2] (33)
and
L1 =

−0.5
0
0
0
0
 L2 =

0.05 0
−0.5 0
0 −0.5
0 0
0 0
 L3 =

0 0
0 0
0.05 0
−0.5 0
0 −0.5

(34)
We conducted two simulations, where the platoon was un-
attacked and attacked. In the attack simulations, the attacker
chose v1,n and ν2,3,n to be zero mean i.i.d. jointly Gaussian
random variables with variance 0.5 and 0.2 · I, respectively.
Fig. 1 shows the results of applying our statistical test (20),
and the plots show that our statistical watermarking test can
detect the presence or absence of an attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper developed statistical watermarking to detect
sensor and communication attacks on networked LTI sys-
tems. Unlike the non-networked case, watermarking in the
networked case requires a K so that A+BK is controllable
with respect to each Bi. This ensures the private watermark-
ing signal of each subcontroller is seen in the output of
all subcontrollers. We provided two algorithms to compute
such a controller. The efficacy of our watermarking approach
was demonstrated by a simulation of a three car platoon.
One possible direction for future work is to explore the
performance of our watermarking test under specific types
of attacks, such as replay attacks or network disturbances.
REFERENCES
[1] A. A. Ca´rdenas, S. Amin, and S. Sastry, “Research challenges for the
security of control systems.” in HotSec, 2008.
[2] M. Abrams and J. Weiss, “Malicious control system cyber security
attack case study–Maroochy water services, australia,” MITRE, 2008.
[3] R. Langner, “Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon,” IEEE
Security & Privacy, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 49–51, 2011.
[4] B. Parno, M. Luk, E. Gaustad, and A. Perrig, “Secure sensor network
routing: A clean-slate approach,” in ACM CoNEXT, 2006.
[5] V. Kumar, J. Srivastava, and A. Lazarevic, Managing cyber threats:
issues, approaches, and challenges. Springer, 2006, vol. 5.
[6] W. Wang and Z. Lu, “Cyber security in the smart grid: Survey and
challenges,” Computer Networks, vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 1344–1371, 2013.
[7] K.-D. Kim and P. R. Kumar, “Cyber–physical systems: A perspective
at the centennial,” Proc. of IEEE, vol. 100, pp. 1287–1308, 2012.
[8] Y. Mo and B. Sinopoli, “Secure control against replay attacks,” in
Allerton Conference. IEEE, 2009, pp. 911–918.
[9] Y. Mo, E. Garone, A. Casavola, and B. Sinopoli, “False data injection
attacks against state estimation in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc.
of IEEE CDC, 2010, pp. 5967–5972.
[10] Y. Mo, R. Chabukswar, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks
on scada systems,” IEEE CST, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 1396–1407, 2014.
[11] S. Weerakkody, Y. Mo, and B. Sinopoli, “Detecting integrity attacks
on control systems using robust physical watermarking,” in Proc. of
IEEE CDC, 2014, pp. 3757–3764.
[12] Y. Mo, S. Weerakkody, and B. Sinopoli, “Physical authentication
of control systems: Designing watermarked control inputs to detect
counterfeit sensor outputs,” IEEE Control Systems, vol. 35, no. 1, pp.
93–109, 2015.
[13] M. Heymann, “Comments on “on pole assignment in multi-input con-
trollable linear systems”,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 748–749, 1968.
[14] M. L. Hautus, “A simple proof of heymann’s lemma,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Automatic Control, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 885–886, 1977.
[15] B. Satchidanandan and P. Kumar, “Dynamic watermarking: Active
defense of networked cyber-physical systems,” Proc. of IEEE, 2016.
[16] W.-H. Ko, B. Satchidanandan, and P. Kumar, “Theory and imple-
mentation of dynamic watermarking for cybersecurity of advanced
transportation systems,” in Proc. of IEEE CNS, 2016, pp. 416–420.
[17] P. Hespanhol, M. Porter, R. Vasudevan, and A. Aswani, “Dynamic
watermarking for general LTI systems,” in IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control, 2017, to appear.
[18] H. Gonzalez and E. Polak, “On the perpetual collision-free rhc of
fleets of vehicles,” Journal of optimization theory and applications,
vol. 145, no. 1, pp. 76–92, 2010.
[19] A. Aswani and C. Tomlin, “Game-theoretic routing of GPS-assisted
vehicles for energy efficiency,” in ACC, 2011, pp. 3375–3380.
[20] W. Zhang, M. Kamgarpour, D. Sun, and C. J. Tomlin, “A hierarchical
flight planning framework for air traffic management,” Proceedings of
the IEEE, vol. 100, no. 1, pp. 179–194, 2012.
[21] R. Vasudevan, V. Shia, Y. Gao, R. Cervera-Navarro, R. Bajcsy, and
F. Borrelli, “Safe semi-autonomous control with enhanced driver
modeling,” in ACC, 2012, pp. 2896–2903.
[22] S. Mohan and R. Vasudevan, “Convex computation of the reachable
set for hybrid systems with parametric uncertainty,” in Proc. of ACC,
2016, pp. 5141–5147.
[23] G. Como, E. Lovisari, and K. Savla, “Convexity and robustness of
dynamic network traffic assignment for control of freeway networks,”
IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 335–340, 2016.
[24] D. P. Shepard, T. E. Humphreys, and A. A. Fansler, “Evaluation
of the vulnerability of phasor measurement units to GPS spoofing
attacks,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection,
vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 146–153, 2012.
[25] T. Nighswander, B. Ledvina, J. Diamond, R. Brumley, and D. Brumley,
“GPS software attacks,” in ACM CCS, 2012, pp. 450–461.
[26] C. Bonebrake and L. R. O’Neil, “Attacks on GPS time reliability,”
IEEE Security Privacy, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 82–84, May 2014.
[27] S. Boyd, L. El Ghaoui, E. Feron, and V. Balakrishnan, Linear matrix
inequalities in system and control theory. SIAM, 1994.
[28] M. C. de Oliveira, J. Bernussou, and J. C. Geromel, “A new discrete-
time robust stability condition,” Systems & control letters, vol. 37,
no. 4, pp. 261–265, 1999.
[29] A. G. Ulsoy, H. Peng, and M. C¸akmakci, Automotive control systems.
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
